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THE EU SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL PROTECTION AFTER 





Allow me first of all to express my grateful thanks to the Faculty of 
Law of the University of Zagreb and especially to Dean Potočnjak and 
Professor Rodin for the kind invitation to visit the University and deliver 
a lecture this morning. I consider it both a pleasure and a privilege to be 
here today in front of such a distinguished audience and I must confess 
that, although Croatia is not yet a member state of the European Uni-
on, the Court of Justice of the European Union has already developed a 
certain bond with Croatian institutions and especially the University of 
Zagreb. 
On the one hand, as you probably know, one of the basic features of 
the Court of Justice is its multilingual regime. Therefore our translation 
department has already started the procedure in order to constitute a 
first nucleus of Croatian lawyer-linguists that will arrive in Luxembourg 
six months before the accession and assist in the preparations. The coo-
peration of our services with this University have, to my knowledge, been 
very beneficial.
On the other hand, the Court has welcomed students and alumni 
from the University of Zagreb on numerous occasions both as interns 
but, most importantly, as participants in the European Law Moot Court 
Competition. In fact it is with great satisfaction that we have seen the 
team of the University of Zagreb compete in the finals four times in the 
last six years and win this prestigious competition this past April. 
This shows that the work being done here in the Faculty of Law is 
extraordinary and that the knowledge in EU law is at a very high level. 
Therefore, for today’s lecture I opted not to speak generally about the 
role and the functioning of the Court but I selected a topic that is more 
specific and current: the reforms of the EU system of judicial protection 
pursuant to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
*   This is the transcript of the speech given by Mr Vassilios Skouris, President of the 
European Court of Justice on the occasion of his visit to the Croatian Supreme Court. The 
speech was delivered at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb in June 2011.   
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As an introductory observation, I would like to stress that the Treaty 
of Lisbon was not intended to introduce a major overhaul of the admini-
stration of justice in the European Union. The reforms and modifications 
introduced are of a limited nature and were in my view destined to perfect 
or improve the current system without changing it dramatically.
Nevertheless, I decided that, a year and a half after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it would be useful to present the most im-
portant reforms it introduced concerning the Court of Justice and the 
system of judicial protection of the European Union. Accordingly, I will 
provide you with some first thoughts and comments on how these re-
forms are functioning in practice.
Denomination of the EU Judicial Institutions
I will start by focusing on the more general provisions and first draw 
your attention to article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). 
Under this article “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall 
include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts.” 
With the wording of this article the concept of “one Institution - 3 courts” 
becomes more evident and the fact that the term “Court of Justice of the 
European Union” is to be understood as designating the Institution as a 
whole, is certainly likely to clarify certain misconceptions or misunder-
standings in some provisions of the Treaties.
Nevertheless, the renaming of the EU Courts has raised certain 
issues and could be considered as somehow problematic. In particular, 
the Court is referred to in the Treaties as “Court of Justice” and the 
Court of First Instance has been renamed to “General Court”. The need 
to rethink the denomination of the EU Courts arose principally from the 
fact that, following the introduction of specialised courts, the CFI was no 
longer a true “court of first instance” since it also hears appeals against 
the judgments of specialised courts at last instance. However, the spe-
cific terms chosen seem to give rise to concerns insofar as, it is not easy 
to distinguish the roles of the “Court of Justice” and the “General Court” 
particularly in view of the fact that the latter is not a Court of general 
jurisdiction and the former is at the top of the EU judicial hierarchy. In 
certain languages such as French and German, the terms chosen (“Cour” 
and “Tribunal”/ “Gerichtshof” and “Gericht”) are much more appropriate. 
On the contrary, in other languages, such as in English and others, the 
terms could be considered as perplexing. 
Recognition of the decentralised nature of the EU system of judicial 
protection  
Moving on from these terminological problems, I would like to un-
derline the addition of a very significant new provision in article 19 TEU. 
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The second indent of the first paragraph provides that “Member States 
shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the 
fields covered by Union law.” By this strongly worded provision, the TEU 
gives a particular emphasis on the decentralised nature of the system of 
administration of justice within the EU and underlines the obligation of 
Member States to provide adequate judicial protection to individuals for 
rights that they derive from EU law. In this way, the TEU confirms that 
the national judge is usually the first one to apply and enforce EU law 
and that the system of judicial protection in the EU can only fulfil its pur-
pose if it functions efficiently both at the EU and at national level.
Apart from these observations of a more general nature, it would be 
useful to present in a little more detail some of the more specific innova-
tions introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. But first of all, allow me to make 
a preliminary comment. As we all know, the Treaty of Nice had introdu-
ced a number of major reforms in the system of judicial protection of the 
European Union, reforms that have by now already produced their first 
results. Neither the Constitutional Treaty nor the Treaty of Lisbon have 
attempted to introduce reforms of such magnitude. 
The advisory panel of article 255 TFEU 
However, some important innovations do feature in the Treaty of Li-
sbon and one of them is without doubt the advisory panel of article 255 
TFEU. This panel has been set up in order to give an opinion on candi-
dates’ suitability to perform the duties of Judge and Advocate-General of 
the Court of Justice and the General Court, before the governments of the 
Member States make the relevant appointments. 
This panel is comprised of seven persons chosen from among former 
members of the Court of Justice and the General Court, members of nati-
onal supreme courts and lawyers of recognised competence, one of whom 
was proposed by the European Parliament. In that respect, three obser-
vations ought to be made. First, the introduction of this advisory panel 
is a step towards the right direction in the interest of transparency. In 
addition, the appointment procedure for members of the Court of Justice 
and the General Court does not remain an exclusively national matter 
but acquires an EU dimension. Second, with regard to the composition 
of the panel, it is noteworthy that only former members of the Court of 
Justice or the General Court can sit on the panel, whereas members of 
national supreme courts can still be active judges. Third, despite lengthy 
discussions and many voices advocating for complete parliamentary he-
arings, we notice that the EU legislator opted for a much more discrete 
role of the European Parliament in the appointment procedure. This co-
uld be viewed as a wise choice as it avoids politicising the appointments 
procedure. […]
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Imposing a lump sum or periodic penalty on Member States
The next important reform we can encounter in article 260, para-
graph 3, TFEU. It is well known that the procedure for imposing on a 
Member State the payment of a lump or a periodic penalty for failure 
to comply with a judgment of the Court was introduced by the Treaty 
of Maastricht.  With article 260, paragraph 3, TFEU, this procedure be-
comes even more drastic given that on certain cases a lump sum or a 
periodic penalty could be imposed on a Member state without a second 
judgement by the Court of Justice. In particular, when the Commission 
brings a infringement action against a Member State pursuant to Article 
258 TFEU on the grounds that the Member State concerned has failed to 
fulfil its obligation to notify measures transposing a directive adopted un-
der a legislative procedure, it may, when it deems appropriate, specify the 
amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member 
State concerned which it considers suitable in the circumstances.
This new provision undoubtedly enhances the mechanism of judici-
al enforcement in the EU. However, it is only applicable in cases where 
Member States have failed to notify the transposition of a directive. And 
this creates an obvious paradox. The simple failure to notify the mea-
sures transposing a directive can be sanctioned in a more severe way 
that the substantial failure to transpose the directive. How this paradox 
could be resolved remains to be seen. One approach could be based on 
the flexibility and wide margin of discretion that the Commission enjoys 
in this area. For example, the Commission could propose higher lump 
sums or periodic penalties in cases where the failure to notify the natio-
nal measures is coupled with a non transposition of the directive. 
Locus standi of individuals to challenge acts of EU Institutions
The Treaty of Lisbon does not only reinforce the mechanism of judi-
cial enforcement of EU law by article 260, paragraph 3, TFEU but also by 
a substantial modification of the provision related to the locus standi of 
natural and legal persons to challenge acts adopted by the EU Instituti-
ons. The conditions of individual and direct concern that were laid down 
in the old article 230, paragraph 4, EC had been severely criticised in 
academia and other circles, especially in view of the adoption of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights as a binding legal text and part of EU primary 
law. Both during the proceedings for the elaboration of the Charter and 
those for the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty, there was extensive 
discussion on the various approaches in order to render the judicial pro-
tection of individuals more effective.
Finally, the approach that was considered the most appropriate was 
that of modifying article 230, paragraph 4, EC. In that respect I will sim-
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ply mention that although the conditions of direct and individual concern 
are in principle maintained, the new article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU, 
further provides that for challenging a regulatory act that does not entail 
implementing measures, an individual need only be directly concerned 
(and not individually).
It could be argued that, with this important addition, the EU legi-
slator has adequately addressed the main criticism against the current 
system which is that individuals cannot challenge regulations which are 
of direct but not individual concern to them. However, one could foresee 
a rather delicate and complicated interpretative problem in defining the 
exact content of the term “regulatory acts”. Such a term can be encoun-
tered in various national legal orders but it is rather unusual in the fra-
mework of the EU legal order. Furthermore, it does not seem to exhaust 
its content in regulations alone. Therefore, notwithstanding the new wor-
ding of article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU, it will again be up to the Court of 
Justice to define more specifically the conditions under which individuals 
will have locus standi to challenge acts of the EU Institutions.
Area of Freedom Security and Justice and the urgent preliminary 
procedure
One of the main features of the Treaty of Lisbon is the fact that the 
three-pillar structure of the EU has been abandoned. This inevitably le-
ads to an expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction in the so-called area of 
freedom security and justice both with regard to preliminary references 
and direct actions. As regards in particular the preliminary references in 
this field, the Treaty of Lisbon abolished in principle all the restrictions 
as to which national courts can make references and we now routinely 
receive cases from lower courts. This has led to an increase of the inco-
ming references in areas such as the Brussels regulations on the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgements in civil, commercial and matrimonial 
matters, on the European arrest warrant, on asylum and refugees. 
In addition, the traditional structure of the preliminary reference 
procedure was considered to be inappropriate for dealing with some time-
sensitive cases in this area. Such time-sensitive cases include those that 
concern persons in custody and those that involve sensitive family law 
issues such as child custody.
Article 267, paragraph 4, TFEU provides that if a preliminary que-
stion is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union shall act with the minimum of delay. For dealing with such 
cases the Court considered from the outset that the existing procedural 
framework was rather inadequate. It therefore proposed an amendment 
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to its rules of procedure in order to introduce the urgent preliminary 
ruling procedure. I do not wish to present this new procedure in detail.    
I will simply mention that the principal features of the urgent preli-
minary ruling procedure are three. First, the written procedure is limited 
to the parties to the main proceedings, the Member State from which the 
reference is made, the European Commission and the other institutions if 
a measure of theirs is at issue. The parties and all the interested persons 
referred to in Article 23 of the Statute will be able to participate in an 
oral procedure, when they can express a view on the written observations 
that have been lodged. Second, cases subject to the urgent preliminary 
ruling procedure will, as soon as they arrive at the Court, be assigned to 
a Chamber of five Judges that is specially designated for this purpose. 
Finally, the procedure in these cases will for the most part be conducted 
electronically, since the new provisions of the Rules of Procedure allow 
procedural documents to be lodged and served by fax or e-mail.
The urgent preliminary ruling procedure has already been requested 
21 times by national courts and the request was accepted in 14 cases. 
So far, this mechanism has proven to be quite efficient since, in all the-
se cases, the Court has managed to render a judgment in less than 2.5 
months.
Judicial control of infringements of the principle of subsidiarity
Another innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon that I would like to men-
tion is the procedure provided for in article 8 of protocol n° 2 to the Tre-
aty on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportiona-
lity. Pursuant to this article, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
has jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle 
of subsidiarity by a legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules 
laid down in Article 263 TFEU by Member States, or notified by them in 
accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or 
a chamber thereof. This article further provides that in accordance with 
the rules laid down in article 263 TFEU, the Committee of the Regions 
may also bring such actions against legislative acts for the adoption of 
which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that 
it be consulted.
Undoubtedly, with this protocol, national parliaments are called to 
play a very specific and important role in the system of judicial protecti-
on in the European Union. If a number of national parliaments consider 
that a proposal for an EU legislative act is in violation of the principle of 
subsidiarity, the said draft legislative act must be re-examined and, if 
maintained, it must specifically be justified as to why it is considered to 
be in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
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If notwithstanding this procedure a national parliament still con-
siders that the adopted legislative act is in violation of the principle of 
subsidiarity, it can file an action for annulment pursuant to article 263 
TFEU. I must underline at this point that, in such actions, the Court will 
exercise judicial review only on the issue of compliance or not with the 
principle of subsidiarity and not on other grounds for annulment.
It remains to be seen how this procedure will function in practice 
and whether such actions before the Court of justice will be a frequent 
occurrence or a rarity.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU accession to the 
ECHR
The last innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon I would like to focus on 
this morning is the conversion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into 
a binding legal text which is part of EU primary law. The introduction of 
a legally binding Bill of Rights for the EU is certainly a very important 
step forward towards increasing the democratic legitimacy of the EU and 
advancing European integration. However, the conversion of the Charter 
into a binding legal text did not literally introduce a third system of pro-
tection of fundamental rights in Europe. Before the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the EU was no stranger to the protection of fundamental 
rights. Therefore it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that a third 
system of protection already existed decades before the 1st of December 
2009. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the added value of a legally 
binding Charter is limited. On the contrary, transparency, codification 
and legal certainty are of paramount importance in the field of funda-
mental rights protection and they cannot be effectively achieved without 
a legally binding Bill of Rights. 
This has become evident in the Court’s jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
Court has already examined the first cases involving a direct application 
of the provisions of the Charter and has already annulled EU law provisi-
ons on the basis of the Charter on two occasions. I must also note that its 
classic legal reasoning in the field of the protection of fundamental rights 
has changed, since the Court is now using as a starting point the Charter 
and not the common constitutional traditions of the member states and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). According to this 
new approach, the Court takes as its starting point the rights guaranteed 
by the Charter, it applies them based on its own jurisprudence as well as 
the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and 
refers lastly and only if it is required to the provisions of the ECHR, which 
constituted until the primary source of reference.  
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Nevertheless, it is true that a multitude of sources of law with some-
times overlapping fields of application (national constitutions, Charter, 
ECHR) is certainly not efficient and can be the source of confusion for 
private individuals, lawyers and judges. The range of the protected rights 
and the level of protection can be different from one text to another. The 
risk of conflicting case-law between the ECJ on the one hand and natio-
nal supreme courts and the EurCourtHR on the other is always present. 
But these problems are by no means novel and they are surely not the 
result of the transformation of the Charter into a binding legal text.
Furthermore, the evolution of fundamental rights protection in the 
EU clearly demonstrates that such difficulties are not insurmountable 
and can be resolved in a variety of ways. Differences in the ratione ma-
teriae field of application of the Charter, of the ECHR and of national 
constitutions would normally be negligible due to the common long-stan-
ding tradition of human rights protection in Europe and to the overall 
harmonising effect of the ECHR. Conflicting case-law, especially between 
the ECJ and the ECHR, has been a rare and marginal occurrence and 
that risk can always be minimised by a close cooperation between the 
two Courts. 
Lastly, the lack of efficiency and coherence resulting from the pa-
rallel application of three systems of protection of fundamental rights will 
be decisively reduced by the accession of the EU to the ECHR. In that res-
pect, it is important to stress that the first round of negotiations within 
the EU has been completed and a mandate was given to the European 
Commission in order to commence the next round of negotiations with 
the Council of Europe. These negotiations are at their final stage and we 
expect to see the draft accord within the next few weeks.
Concluding remarks
I believe that my initial comment regarding the extent of the reforms 
that were introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon to the system of judicial 
protection of the European Union is confirmed by a basic analysis of the 
innovations the Treaty entails. Some of these reforms are important and 
they constitute steps that can bring about a concrete amelioration of the 
system. Nevertheless, the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon had no inten-
tion of introducing radical reforms that would alter the fundamentals of 
the system. Whether such reforms were needed at that stage, especially 
given the particular political context marked by the rejection of the Con-
stitutional treaty, is in my view questionable and could certainly be an 
issue for debate.
The system of judicial protection in the European Union as it re-
sulted from the Treaty of Lisbon is certainly viable and able to function 
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efficiently for a number of years. Nonetheless, the progress of European 
integration will render more radical reforms necessary in the long run in 
order to ensure that the administration of justice in the European Union 
can continue to serve efficiently a Union of more than 500 million citi-
zens, 23 languages and 27 legal traditions.
I thank you very much for your attention I would like to open the 
floor to your questions.
